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Abstract
The importance of information asymmetries in the capital markets is commonly accepted as
one of the main reasons for home bias in investment. We posit that eects of such asymmetries
may be reduced through relationships between banks established through bank-to-bank lending
and provide evidence to support this claim. We construct a global banking network of 7938
banking institutions from 141 countries to analyze the formation of new relationships between
banks during 1980-2009 time period. We nd that recessions and banking crises tend to have
negative eects on the formation of new connections and that these eects are not the same for
all countries or all banks. We also nd that the global nancial crisis of 2008-09 had a large
negative impact on the formation of new relationships in the global banking network.
JEL classication: F34, F36
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11 Introduction
International nance literature has long emphasized the importance of information in international
investment, citing information asymmetry as one of the leading explanations for portfolio home
bias and lack of international diversication.1 Financial globalization created a number of avenues
through which the eects of asymmetric information can potentially be reduced. One of them is
international banking in general and lending of banks to each other in particular.2 It is commonly
accepted that bank lending to corporate borrowers establishes the relationship and produces infor-
mation ows between the lender and the borrower, which in turn facilitate further lending.3 It is
thus reasonable to believe that lending of one bank to another establishes a channel for information
ows between the lender and the borrower that might facilitate future lending, international capital
ows of other types, as well as international trade.
Recent global nancial crisis had a major impact on the global banking system (Milesi-Ferretti
& Tille, 2011). But did the crisis simply aect the volume of bank lending or did it also aect the
structure of international banking system? If relationships between banks play a role, implications
of these two developments are not identical. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the
impact of the global nancial crisis, as well as of country-specic recessions and banking crises of
the past 30 years on the formation of new relationships between banks and the importance of banks
in the aected country. To achieve our goal, we use micro-level data on international syndicated
bank loans from Loan Analytics database to construct a bank-level global banking network (GBN)
1A number of models of international portfolio ows rely on the assumption of information asymmetry between
local and foreign markets (Brennan & Cao, 1997; Okawa & Van Wincoop, 2010). Portes et al. (2001) and Portes &
Rey (2005) provide direct evidence of the importance of information in determining bilateral patterns of aggregate
international capital ows, while Kang & Stulz (1997) and Hatchondo (2008) show that such patterns are consistent
with the model that is based on asymmetric information. Local informational advantages have also been documented
in various contexts in nance literature (Ahearne et al., 2004; Bae et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2008; Coval & Moscowitz,
2001; Huberman, 2001). Veldcamp & Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) present a theoretical argument for persistence of
information asymmetry.
2Milesi-Ferretti & Tille (2011) emphasize prominent growth of international banking prior to the global nancial
crisis.
3See survey by Boot (2000).
2and analyze the dynamics of its structure. This is the rst study in which bank-level network is
analyzed in a global scale.4
We construct a global network of banks in which relationships are formed by banks extending
loans to each other, taking into account the direction of the lending. Because we are interested
in the dynamics of these network statistics, we construct two panel data sets, each at bank-year
level. One, noncumulative panel, consists of separate new networks based on loans made in each of
the years between 1980 and 2009 thus providing snapshots of lending patterns for each year. The
other, cumulative panel is constructed by adding new loans to the network that starts in 1980 and
expands through 2009, allowing us to distinguish old and new relationships. For each bank in each
year we compute the number of direct lending and borrowing connections, i.e. number of borrowers
and lenders, and identify whether the this bank in a given year played a role as a key intermediary,
that is whether it was the only bank connecting at least one pair of other banks to each other.
To verify that relationships between banks dened by lending of one bank to another have
indeed an eect on lending and borrowing, we demonstrate, in a bank-level xed eects regression,
that establishing a new relationship increases the amount of new loan origination to or by this
bank in the following three years. Moreover, in a country-level xed eects regression, we nd that
when the number of key banks in a given country increases, that country experiences an increase in
both lending and borrowing in at least four years that follow. In a related study, Hale et al. (2011)
provide evidence that connections between banks, as dened in this paper, are positively related
to international FDI and portfolio ows. Finally, there is evidence that countries in which banks
were more connected to other banks through syndicated loan market experienced a lesser impact
of the global nancial crisis (Caballero et al., 2009).
We next describe the dynamics of the overall network size and connectivity over our sample
4In the existing literature, either global network is analyzed at a country level (Garratt et al., 2011; Kubelec &
S a, 2010; Minoiu & Reyes, 2011; von Peter, 2007) or bank-level network is constructed for a specic country (Cocco
et al., 2009; Craig & von Peter, 2010).
3period. We nd that since the 1980s the global banking network experienced two major periods
of rapid expansion | one in the early 1990s and one between 2002 and 2006. These periods of
expansion were characterized by an increasing number of banks, increasing number of connections
between banks, and increasing number of countries in which banks participate in the GBN. Im-
portantly, network expansion during these periods was achieved more through formation of new
connections by existing banks than trough an increase in the number of banks. We also observe
that formation of new connections and the share of banks that are key intermediaries tend to de-
cline during recessions in the United States. We very clearly observe a collapse of the GBN during
the global nancial crisis that brought most measures of the network back to the level that was
observed prior to the 2002-2006 expansion.
Before turning to the regression analysis of bank-level network statistics, we present a stylized
two-country model of bank relationships that arise endogenously and respond to shocks such as
demand, supply, and cost of capital. The model predicts that local recessions in small countries
can increase the number of new connections established between the banks initially, but will lower
them in the long run. A recession in the United States (a larger country and \the world banker")
would increase the number of new connections made because U.S. banks would seek investment
abroad. A local systemic banking crisis in a small country, represented by an increase in the cost
of funding in this country, would lead to an increase in the number of new relationships formed. A
global banking crisis, however, if thought of as a decline in the value of future relationships, would
result in fewer new connections.
To study the eects of country-specic recessions and banking crises and to control for the
eects of total lending and borrowing when studying the eects of the global nancial crisis, we
turn to the regression analysis. Because we are interested in the eects on new connections, we
conduct our regression analysis using the cumulative network. We nd that, conditional on total
borrowing and lending, local recessions lead to fewer new connections made by banks in the aected
4country, especially banks that are smaller or that are located in developing countries. We nd that
local banking crises have a negative eect on the formation of new borrowing connections.5 During
the recessions in the U.S. large banks are more likely to nd new borrowers and establish more new
lending connections than during other times. In addition, the number of new key banks tends to
fall in countries that experience recessions.
We nd a large negative eect of the global nancial crisis on the formation of new connections,
which was felt most strongly through a decline in entry of new banks from developing countries into
the GBN and decline in the number of connections made, especially by large banks.6 We also nd
that the formation of new key banks declined and moved from developing to industrial countries
during the crisis. These eects of the global nancial crisis are conditional on total lending and
borrowing as well as on the eects of local recessions that occurred in most countries in our sample
during crisis years.
We make the following conclusions from the analysis. Recessions and as banking crises have an
important eect on the development of the global banking network through lowering the number of
new connections banks make and the distribution of these connections across banks and countries.
Thus, we show that in addition to real costs of banking crises (Reinhart & Rogo, 2009; Schularick
& Taylor, 2010), there are costs associated with deterioration of bank relationships. Furthermore,
we show that the eects of the global nancial crisis on the global banking network were especially
large and unevenly distributed across banks and countries. Importantly, fewer banks during the
crisis played key intermediation roles, especially in developing countries. Combined with the nding
that new relationships and the number of key banks tend to have a persistent eect on borrowing
and lending, our results provide an additional mechanism that may partly explain the collapse
in international capital ows during the crisis and the fact that it was especially pronounced in
5This nding is consistent with that in Peek & Rosengren (2000) for the case of Japan.
6As Rose & Wieladek (2011) demonstrate, some of this decline may be due to an increase in nancial protectionism
associated with massive injections of public funds into banks during the crisis.
5emerging markets (Milesi-Ferretti & Tille, 2011).7
Our paper also has a methodological implication for the active literature on the stability of
banking network. Many recent papers on nancial networks analyze the potential for the spread
of contagion in various exogenous network structures using simulation methods (Battiston et al.,
2009; May & Arinaminpathy, 2010; Mirchev et al., 2010; Nier et al., 2007; Sachs, 2010). Others em-
pirically analyze the structure or the development of country-specic and global banking networks
(Cocco et al., 2009; Craig & von Peter, 2010; Garratt et al., 2011; von Peter, 2007). A handful of
papers model how relationships between banks form networks endogenously (Allen & Gale, 2000;
Castiglionesi & Navarro, 2007; Delli Gatti et al., 2010). The ndings of our paper contribute to
this literature by showing that the structure of a global banking network responds to economic and
nancial shocks, and therefore it may not be appropriate to model banking networks as static or
exogenous, especially when analyzing the eects of nancial shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data and methodology, mostly
focusing on the construction of the global banking network and the network statistics. Section 3
describes the evolution of the network structure over time. Section 4 presents a stylized model
of the formation of bank relationships. Section 5 presents the results of our regression analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Constructing global banking network
In the wake of the global nancial crisis, the complex structure of bank relationships started to
garner attention in the literature. One direction of this analysis turned to representing banking sys-
tems as graphs, or networks.8 This literature mostly focuses on the short-run aspects of connections
7For comprehensive analysis of factors aecting global capital ows during the crisis and the recovery, see Fratzscher
(2011).
8Some recent papers are Chan-Lau et al. (2009); Haldane (2009) and Haldane & May (2011). The application
of the network approach to nancial markets follows recent literature on networks in social interactions and rm
6between banks, that is, liquidity exposures of banks to one another, the topology of which aects
the stability of the banking system and the propagation of the shocks. As discussed above, in this
paper we take a longer-run view of connections between banks, interpreting lending relationships
as connections that facilitate information ows.
Unlike much of the recent empirical analysis of banking and nancial networks that build
on aggregate country-level bilateral bank lending from the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) data and bilateral asset holdings from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) (Garratt et al., 2011; Kubelec & S a, 2010; Minoiu & Reyes,
2011; von Peter, 2007), this paper constructs a global banking network at the bank level, something
that has not been done before.9 There are two main reasons why loan-level data are more suitable
for the construction of the network than BIS statistics. First, the BIS reports stocks of claims and
does not provide information on the origination time of these claims. The BIS computes \ows"
as a change in stocks, and therefore such ows include, in addition to loan origination, repayments
and changes in valuations of these stocks. As a result, such data cannot provide clean information
on the formation of new relationships between banks (or countries, in case of BIS data). Second,
country-level data do not distinguish between cases with many loans of smaller amounts made in
many dierent pairs of banks and cases where only a few large loans are made between a small
number of bank pairs. Loan-level data address both of these concerns | they give the date of the
loan origination and allow us to compute network statistics at the bank level.
We assume that each loan from bank to bank creates a relationship, or link, thus contributing
to the network. Our data consist of syndicated bank loans with median maturity of about 5 years.
theory. Karlan et al. (2009) oers a theoretical model of networks in social interactions, while papers by Bottazzi
et al. (2009); Guiso et al. (2009) and Lehmann & Neuberger (2001) provide some discussion of the importance of
trust and social interactions for investment, economic exchange, and lending. The work on social capital pioneered
by Putnam (1995) is the seed of much of this literature.
9Craig & von Peter (2010) use data from the German interbank market to test for tiering in the banking network;
Cocco et al. (2009) build, for the Portuguese interbank market, \borrower preference" and \lender preference" indexes
based on loans between banks, but do not go so far as to create a network of banks, which would take into account
indirect relationships.
7Thus, the relationships we dene are long-term relationships between banks. In constructing a
cumulative network panel by adding new loans to the ones that existed in the prior year we implicitly
make an assumption that relationships between banks that are established through lending persist
even if the loan is repayed.
2.1 Data sources and manipulation
Dealogic's Loan Analytics database (a.k.a. Loanware) provides information on international syn-
dicated bank loans (with some domestic syndicated loans included as well). It has exhaustive
information on the terms of the loan, as well as some information on borrowers and lenders. From
this database, we downloaded information on loans extended between January 1, 1980, and De-
cember 31, 2009, to private- and public-sector banks, a total of 15,324 loans. Out of these, 84 loans
had to be dropped due to missing deal values and 151 had to be dropped due to missing lenders
eld, which left us with the total of 15089 loans.
The Loan Analytics database provides information on syndicated bank loan origination, includ-
ing loans extended to nancial institutions. For our purposes, syndicated loans are a good proxy
for bank relationships because they tend to be of much longer maturities than interbank loans and
thus represent a larger commitment and the potential for information ows. The bank-to-bank
syndicated loan market is relatively large | in the late 1990s syndicated bank loans extended to
banks and reported in Loan Analytics amounted to over 30 percent of total bank claims on banks
as reported by the BIS. This ratio fell to below 20 percent by the end of our sample as interbank
lending ballooned prior to the global nancial crisis. In 2007, prior to the crisis, 4.7 trillion USD
worth of syndicated loans were extended to banks (see Figure 1).10
10BIS reports in its Table 10 in the Annex to Quarterly Report \total amount of syndicated loans signed," which
is substantially smaller than what we nd in our data. This is because BIS excludes the following loans: all loans
with maturity less than three years, all loans where there is only one lender, and all loans where nationality of all
lenders is the same as that of a borrower. This excludes a large portion of the loans, especially taking into account
that BIS includes loans to nonnancial institutions in its Table 10 data.
8We retained the following variables: name of the borrower or borrowers (327 loans had multiple
borrowers), deal nationality, all bank involvement (list of all lenders, administrators, and lead
arrangers), loan signing date, and total deal value in millions of U.S. dollars, which we deate by
the seasonally adjusted U.S. consumer price index (CPI) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Since the loans are syndicated, they have on average about seven participants, with the median
of two participants. Because information on individual lender participation is only available for a
handful of the cases, we split each loan amount equally among lenders and then among borrowers, in
the case of multiple borrowers, replicating observations for each borrower-lender pair and dividing
the total deal value equally among all pairs. We then collapse our data by borrower-lender pair in
each year, adding up the amounts, so that in each year each borrower-lender pair enters only once.
Our list of loans, thus, includes 4880 unique institutions (banks and nonbanks) as lenders only,
2535 unique banks as borrowers only, and 1110 unique banks that appear as both borrowers and
lenders, for a total of 8525 banks.11 For 7938 of the banks we were able to condently match
banks to countries.12 We link each banking entity to a country on a locational basis, treating each
subsidiary or branch as a separate entity.13
2.2 Constructing networks
To construct our noncumulative panel of network statistics, we create a separate network for each
year. To do so, for each of the 30 years covered in the data, we create a list that has only three
elements: borrower, lender, and nominal loan amount, referred to as the \edge list." Using a
custom Mata code for Stata (Miura, 2010), we create for each year a network and compute network
11While we are restricting borrower type to be a bank, for technical reasons we cannot restrict lenders to be banks.
In our data set, out of 5990 lenders (including those that also appear as borrowers), a maximum of 1710 are nonbanks,
e.g., insurance companies and special purpose vehicles.
12If a given institution was associated with country X in one observation and country Y in another, we eliminate
both observations.
13Mian (2006) shows that cultural and geographical distances between headquarters and local branches play an
important role.
9statistics at the network and bank-level as described below.14 We construct for our regression
analysis a bank-year panel, heavily unbalanced, by combining each year's network statistics for
each bank in one data set.
For cumulative panel, we create a set of edge lists, where for each subsequent year we add
loans to those in previous years. Thus, we have edge lists including loans extended in 1980, 1980
and 1981, 1980 through 1982, etc. all the way through the full set of loans extended between 1980
and 2009. From each edge list we, once again, construct a network, but this time the network is
larger every year and the network statistics for year t are based on the network made out of loans
between 1980 and t. We combine this information into a cumulative bank-year panel and compute
percentage changes in network statistics for each bank for each year from a previous year. The
cumulative panel contains more observations because once a bank enters the network, it stays in
the network throughout the sample.
Note that our networks are directed, that is the direction of relationship matters, in that bank A
borrowing from bank B is not the same as bank B borrowing from bank A. For both noncumulative
and cumulative panels we also construct country-level data sets of weighted averages of network
statistics using as weights the amounts borrowed and lent by each bank, converted to U.S. dollars
using the exchange rate on the day the loan contract was signed and deated by the monthly U.S.
CPI.15
2.3 Network statistics
Some terminology needs to be introduced to describe precisely the network statistics used in this
paper. The vertices (nodes) of the network, banks in our case, are indexed by i = 1;:::;I. The
edges (direct connections) between each pair of nodes i and j, loans in our case, are denoted by cij,
14We check our computations, when possible, against MatlabBGL version 4.0, which makes use of the Boost Graph
Library.
15Detailed information at the country-year level is available in the Electronic Appendix.
10which is binary f0;1g. Not every pair of nodes is connected by edges. The edges carry the weights
which measure the intensity of the connection, or loan amount, which we denote as wij. Note that
wij > 0 if cij = 1 and wij = 0 if cij = 0. The edges are directed so that cij 6= cji and wij 6= wji.
We will denote cij and wij as connections going from node i to node j, i.e. a loan from bank i to
bank j.
A path between each pair of nodes i and j is a sequence of edges that connect i to j. There
could be many paths connecting each pair of nodes and, because the network is directed, paths
from i to j do not generally coincide with paths from j to i. For our purposes, the length of a path
is the number of edges that comprise that path regardless of the weight; the weight is only used
later when we aggregate network statistics across banks. A geodesic path is a path between two
given nodes that has the shortest possible length. We denote the length of the geodesic path from
node i to node j as gij. Note that each pair of nodes i and j can have more than one geodesic path
which will, by denition, have the same length. Because the network is directed, there are pairs
of nodes for which there is a path in one direction but not in the other. We denote the number
of geodesic paths from i to j as pij. We denote the number of geodesic paths that go from i to j
through k as pikj.
We rst construct the statistics that describe the network as a whole





cji)=(N(N   1)). Density is 2 [0;1] and describes how connected the nodes are within the
network, it is sometimes referred to as connectivity or connectedness of a network;
 Diameter is the length of the longest geodesic path in the network: maxij gij. It measures
the span of the network;
We next calculate the following measures for each node:
 OutDegree is the number of edges originating from node i:
P
i cij;
11 InDegree is the number of edges terminating in node i:
P
i cji;
 Betweenness is the average ratio of geodesic paths between any pair j and k that go through





In- and outdegree statistics measure how many direct connections each bank has in terms
of borrowing and lending, respectively, that is how many lenders and borrowers each bank has.
Betweenness measures how central the bank is in terms of intermediating bank ows. We dene
a Key bank as bank that has positive betweenness. To identify newly formed relationships and
changes in a bank's status as a key bank, we simply take rst dierences in these variables in the
cumulative network.
Table 1 shows that these statistics are important measures of connections between banks in
terms of bank lending. In columns (1) and (2) we present the results of the estimation of bank xed
eects regression of borrowing and lending, respectively, on contemporaneous and lagged indicators
of whether a bank has established a new borrowing or lending connection. Since all the information
in our data is based on the loan origination, an increase in borrowing or lending in a given year
is entirely due to a new loan facility and is not automatically related to the loan that was made
when connection was established initially in prior years. We nd that adding a new lender increases
bank's borrowing through new loan origination in the following three years, while adding a new
borrower increases bank's lending through new loan origination in the following two years. We nd
that becoming a key bank does not substantially aect that bank's future lending or borrowing.16
In columns (3) and (4) we present the results of the country xed eects regression of country
total borrowing and lending on contemporaneous and lagged number of key banks in that country.
Once again, in each year borrowing and lending reects only new loan origination. We nd that an
increase in the number of key banks in a country leads to a persistent increase in both borrowing
and lending amount by this country. In contrast to the eects on individual banks, average number
16Controlling for the key bank status in these regressions does not alter the results.
12of new borrowing and lending connections in a country does not have an eect on future borrowing
and lending by this country.17
2.4 Recessions and banking crises
To identify years with recessions in the U.S., we use NBER recession dates. To identify local
recessions we use data on real GDP growth from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS)
(line 99b) with missing observations lled in with World Economic Outlook (WEO) data if available.
Since IFS does not report the data for Iceland and Taiwan, we take these series entirely from WEO.
We construct the indicator of local recessions as equal to one whenever the GDP growth rate is
below its linear trend, which is a broader denition than is commonly used but a transparent one
and feasible to compute for most countries.18
Dates of systemic banking crises are taken directly from Laeven & Valencia (2008), which
means that 2008 and 2009 are not coded as banking crises in any country. This is not a problem,
however, because in all regressions we will include dummy variables for 2008 and 2009. In the
regression analysis we lag recession indicators and a banking crisis indicator by one year.19
3 Evolution of the global banking network
We begin our analysis informally, by plotting measures of the network size and connectivity for
each year for cumulative and noncumulative networks over time to see any trends and the eects
of U.S. recessions and of the global nancial crisis in 2008-2009. Figure 2 presents measure of the
size of the network, while Figure 3 presents measures of connectivity.
17Controlling for the average number of new lenders or borrowers in a country does not aect the results of these
regressions.
18For the US, 1995, 2002, and 2007 are classied as recession years by our denition, in addition to all the years
identied as recession years by NBER.
19Electronic Appendix provides complete data on recessions and banking crises in our sample.
13The top panel of Figure 2 plots as a line the number of banks that either borrowed or lent,
or both, in each year in our sample, based on noncumulative network panel, and as bars a number
of new banks that entered the GBN in each year, based on cumulative network panel. We can see
that bank entry slowed down in the decade prior to the global nancial crisis. We can also see the
decline in the total number of banks after 1997, partly driven by a wave of banks' mergers and
acquisitions.20
The middle panel of Figure 2 plots the total number of connections between banks in each
year, and the number of new connections. We can see that until the mid-1990s most connections
in the network were due to new connections made rather than connections between banks that
have interacted with each other in the past. The share of new connections declined in the decade
prior to the global nancial crisis. We can also see a very pronounced drop in connections between
banks during the crisis, both in terms of total number of connections and in terms of number of
new connections formed.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 demonstrate that despite the decline in the total number of
banks in the network in recent years, country representation continued to grow with banks from new
countries entering the GBN and more and more countries participating in the syndicated lending
activity in each year. In the largest network we constructed, cumulative network as of 2009, there
are banks from 141 countries. Most of this growth in the number of countries is accounted for by
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and by the entry of the African and Central
American nations into global capital markets.
All three panels of Figure 2 show quite clearly two periods of rapid expansion of the GBN.
First occurred in the early 1990s and the second in the rst six years of this century. These two
episodes are frequently characterized as lending booms in the literature. Here we show that not
only the volume of lending grew rapidly during these periods, but also lending and borrowing was
20In the U.S. the wave of bank mergers was precipitated by Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 (Pillo, 2004).
14conducted by more and more banks to and from more and more new counterparties. The latter
is demonstrated by a growing number of new connections during these periods, which, as we have
argued in the previous section, in itself has likely contributed to increasing globalization of capital
ows and volume of lending activity.
Figure 3 describes the dynamics of network connectivity. We observe an increase in the density
of the network, that is more connections on average per bank during the period when the number
of banks was rapidly declining. The smooth decline of the density of cumulative network is simply
driven by the network expansion over time. We can also observe that not only new connections were
made in the network throughout our sample period, but that the span of the network increased to
reach 18 at its peak in 2007. During the global nancial crisis, however, the network has shrunk |
the only way this can be observed in the cumulative network is when new direct connections are
made between banks that were previously connected through a longer chain.
We dened a key intermediary, or a key bank, as a bank that acts as the only connection
between at least one pair of other banks. While we can see an overall trend increase in the number
of key banks in the network as a share of total number of banks, this trend is partly driven by the
declining number of banks in the network. We can see that the number of new banks that act as
key intermediaries is very small after 1990. In fact, less than 1 percent of new banks in the network
in each year are key banks. In addition, we see a rapid increase in the number of key banks in the
years just prior to the global nancial crisis, reaching over 10 percent at its peak in 2007 prior to
its collapse to just 6 percent during the crisis. As we saw in the previous section, the number of
key banks in a given country is positively associated with borrowing and lending in the subsequent
years, meaning that the structure of the GBN was likely amplifying the global credit cycle.
The nal chart on Figure 4 shows the average number of direct links banks in the network have
and the number of new links they make every year. Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) demonstrated for
the sample of U.S. syndicated loans to corporations that the number of lenders in a given syndicate
15decline during the global nancial crisis. We see this decline in our sample as well | the median
number of participants in a syndicate fell from 4 to 2 between 2007 and 2009. By construction,
this would result in the decline in the average number of direct connections in the GBN. We see,
however, that the decline in the number of connections during the crisis was larger than what can
be accounted by the changing syndicate size. More importantly, very few new connections were
made, and in 2009 the average number of connections in the cumulative network actually declined,
which can only be due to the composition eect | new banks that entered the GBN in 2009 entered
with fewer connections than existing banks had on average.
All charts in Figures 2 and 3 show shading for U.S. recessions. We can see that during U.S.
recessions the number of connections and especially the number of new connections in the GBN
tend to decline. This is evident on the middle panel of Figure 2 and the SE panel of Figure 3. We
can also see that the diameter of the network is smaller during U.S. recessions and that the number
of key intermediaries tends to fall. We can see very prominently that there are almost no new key
banks and no new connections made during U.S. recessions. These observations, however, can be
driven by overall decline in bank lending activity and not really reecting the structural changes in
the network. For this reason, we will analyze the eects of U.S. recessions and the global nancial
crisis on formation of new relationships and on the number of key banks in the regression setting,
which allows us to condition on total borrowing and lending, time trend, as well as country and
bank xed eects.
4 A simple model of bank relationships
Before turning to the regression analysis, to x ideas on how macroeconomic shocks can aect bank
relationships, we present a stylized model of bank relationship formation. It takes the macroecon-
omy as given but allows international bank relationships to form endogenously. In our model
banks have to establish relationships with banks in a foreign country in order to nance foreign
16projects | our short-cut for the idea that banks facilitate capital ows between countries through
intermediation or otherwise.
4.1 Model setup with no relationships, one period
Suppose the world consists of two countries, home and foreign. We denote variables pertaining
to the foreign country with . In each country, banks nance investment projects, which have
heterogeneous returns R. We assume that banks can perfectly select projects with the highest
available return and therefore the return on the marginal project nanced is a declining function
of the number of projects nanced: R0(x) < 0; R00(x) > 0, where x is the number of projects
nanced. We allow this function to be dierent in the foreign country, but have the same properties:
R0(x) < 0; R00(x) > 0. We assume that projects succeed with probability , and otherwise fail
with zero return. We assume that the probability of success is the same in both countries but varies
by the state of nature | it can be either high H with probability 1  or low L with probability
. We interpret the state of nature with a low probability of success as recession, and  as recession
probability. Thus, the expected return on marginal project x is ((1   )H + L)R(x) = R(x),
where  = (1   )H + L.
There are N and N identical risk-neutral banks in domestic and foreign countries that face
exogenous costs of funding: D and D, respectively. They decide whether to invest in domestic
projects, foreign projects, or not to invest at all. Each bank can only nance one project. In
order to invest in a project in a dierent country, a bank has to pay a fee F to a bank in that
country for intermediation. For simplicity, we assume that banks either invest in projects or serve
as intermediaries. Since banks that intermediate do not invest their own money, they don't have
to pay costs of funding. Thus, we also assume that the cost of intermediation is zero and that
the only cost associated with intermediation is an opportunity cost of not being able to nance a
domestic project. Banks that choose to invest in foreign projects have to pay an intermediation fee
17in addition to the cost of funding prior to realization of the return on the project. We denote as
;  the share of banks that nance domestic projects.
Autarky. Suppose N and N are suciently large so that R(N) < D and R(N) < D.
Because of an additional fee required to nance foreign projects, in this case  and  solve
R(N) = D and R(N) = D. This is a market equilibrium as well as the social optimum
because only projects with positive expected net returns are nanced and all of such projects are
nanced at a minimum cost. We abstract from the question of which banks do and which do not
end up nancing projects. One can think of either random or sequential assignment, it does not
aect the predictions of the model.
Foreign nancing. In order to construct an equilibrium in which foreign nancing is present,
we simply assume that the foreign country does not have a sucient number of banks, so that
even if all banks engage in nancing, the marginal project will still have a positive expected net
return, that is R(N) > D. One can interpret this assumption in a number of ways: as
representing an underdeveloped nancial system in foreign country; as representing a lower level of
economic development in a foreign country, and thus higher return on investment; as a lower level
of savings, for institutional or other reasons, which limits the amount of domestic funds available
for investment.
In the home country all projects with positive net expected returns will be nanced by home
banks, so that  is still given by R(N) = D. For the marginal bank to be indierent between
nancing a domestic or a foreign project, the expected return on the foreign project should be
equal to the expected return on the home project. These returns will be zero unless there is still
a positive net return on foreign projects after all interested home and foreign banks have chosen
to invest in them | this case is less interesting, so we assume N is suciently large to rule it
out. Given that  is the share of home banks investing in domestic projects, denote as (1   )
18the share of all domestic banks that choose to invest in foreign projects. This gives us demand for
intermediation.
Foreign banks have a choice between nancing their domestic projects or intermediating. We
assume that all foreign banks that do not invest in domestic projects have an equal chance of
intermediating, which they take as given. Thus, in equilibrium foreign banks will be indierent
between the expected returns from investing in their domestic projects and the expected fees from
participating in the intermediation lottery. Thus, supply of intermediation is jointly determined
with nancing of foreign projects by foreign banks.
The total number of home projects nanced will still be N, while the total number of foreign
projects nanced will be N +(1 )N. The equilibrium is thus a triplet (;;) that solves
the following equations
R(N) = D; (1)
R(N + (1   )N) = F + D; (2)
(1   )N
(1   )NF = R(N + (1   )N)   D: (3)
4.2 Many periods and formation of relationships
To introduce the value of relationships, we need to extend the benchmark model to include multiple
periods. To keep the model simple, we will assume that banks that experience a bad realization
of the project they nance simply exit and are replaced by the same number of banks that are
identical to those remaining. This way, the number of banks in each country remains constant and
we don't have to keep track of each bank's status. The only thing that will be carried from one
period to the next is relationships established through intermediation.
For the value of the relationship to be positive, we will assume that the cost of intermediation
for banks that have already been engaged in the nancing of foreign projects is smaller than the cost
19of intermediation for banks that are entering the market of nancing foreign projects. In particular,
we will keep the intermediation fee for new entrants at F and will assume that banks that have
already established a relationship will only pay f < F in each of the periods when they choose to
nance foreign projects. We will make a slight change for the purpose of model interpretation by
allowing  in the home country to be dierent from  in the foreign country.
We consider an equilibrium with an interior solution, as above, in each period. Period t will
start with tN banks in the home country that have nanced foreign projects in period t   1;
 represents the share of home banks that have established relationships with foreign banks in
previous periods. These banks have a lower cost of nancing foreign projects in period t than
other banks and we assume that they will always choose to nance foreign projects. Thus, t =

t 1(t 1+t 1(1 t 1)), where 
t 1 is the realization of project success probability in the foreign
country in period t   1 and is therefore the probability that a bank that established relationships
in period t 1 will survive in period t, t 1 is the share of banks that already had relationships at
the start of period t   1, t 1 is the share of banks that neither had prior relationships nor were
nancing domestic projects that chose to nance foreign projects in t   1 (and pay the fee F). In
each period, therefore,  is predetermined. Since all time periods are a priori identical, we will
drop the time subscript.
There is now an additional value to nancing foreign projects | the value of relationships that
will with probability  bring rents next period and in every following period s with probability s
in the amount of F   f. This implies the present value of the relationship, Vt =
P1
s=t+1(F   f) =

1 (F   f) 8t.
In the benchmark model, the zero-prot condition for the home banks makes the number of new
connections independent of home economic conditions | whenever  changes to satisfy equation
(1),  adjusts accordingly. Since we are interested in the eects of home economic conditions on
bank relationship, we make another modication to our benchmark mode here, assuming that
20regardless of the number of home projects nanced they pay xed returns  R in the case of success,
thus expected return on the home project is   R. We assume that  R is suciently small so that
a) home banks with existing relationships still prefer to invest in foreign projects, and b) foreign
banks are still not interested in investing in home projects. The choice of  is now irrelevant |
share  of banks that don't have relationship will invest in foreign projects, the rest of them will
invest in home projects.
In equilibrium with an interior solution, home banks without relationships will be indierent
between nancing domestic projects or foreign projects. Foreign banks with relationships will
collect a smaller intermediation fee than banks that provide intermediation for new foreign projects
nancing banks. To make the model interesting and keep it simple, we will assume that foreign
relationship banks all engage in nancing of their domestic projects in addition to collecting the
fee of f. This assumption represents a possibility that maintaining relationships is less costly for
the intermediary than establishing new ones, and thus there is no opportunity cost of maintaining
existing relationships.
As before, remaining N   N foreign banks are indierent between nancing their domestic
project and entering the lottery for intermediation of new foreign investments by home banks, given
that N domestic projects are already taken by relationship banks. Share  of these remaining
banks will nance projects, while the rest will enter the lottery. Denote the number of new con-
nections formed as a share of N,  = (1   ). Then the total number of foreign projects nanced
will be N +(N  N)+( +)N. The equilibrium for each period is thus a pair (;) that
solves the following equations given 
R(	) + V = F +   R; (4)
N
(1   )(N   N)
F = R(	)   D; (5)
21where 	 = (N   N) + (2 + )N is the total number of projects in the foreign country that
are nanced by all banks.
The Appendix shows that this equilibrium will be stable as long as   R D > V and presents
the conditions that need to hold for the solution to be in the interior, that is 0 <  < 1, 0 <  < 1.
It also presents all the derivatives used for comparative statics below.
An expected equilibrium path can be computed using the fact that in expectation  should
be the same in all periods. Thus an expected equilibrium path is values of (;;) that solve
equations (4)-(5) and
 = ( + (1      )) = ( + ): (6)
We will interpret changes to one-period equilibrium described by equations (4)-(5) as short-run
eects and changes to the expected equilibrium path as long-run eects.
4.2.1 Interpretation and comparative statics
We will now consider the interpretation of our model and the implications of parameter changes
for the expected equilibrium path as well as for each period's equilibrium. As we are interested in
banking crises and business cycles, we consider the eects of the following perturbations:
Recession-demand: a bad state of nature (realization  = L) could be thought of as a recession
that is due to an adverse demand shock, as fewer projects are successful. The only eect of
such a shock in a foreign country will be to lower  in the beginning of the period. We can
also think of a permanent adverse demand shock that would increase , a probability of the
bad state of nature, and thus lower  in case of the home country and  in case of the foreign
country.
Recession-supply: we can model a supply-side recession as a decline in returns on projects for
any given number of projects nanced, that is, decline in R() or R().
22Cost of funding: we can think of an increase in the cost of funding D and D as banking crises
in home and foreign countries, respectively.
Intermediation fees: we can think of a global banking crisis as an increase in the costs of inter-
mediation, especially in the cost of establishing new connections, F, which can be interpreted
as an increased counterparty risk premium, although we do not model such risk specically.
An increase in f for a given F can be thought of as a decreased value of relationships for
lenders, which could also be an outcome of a crisis in banks' condence.
The Appendix shows formally the eects of these perturbations on the number of new connections
formed, . Here we provide an informal discussion and intuition of the results.
A temporary adverse demand shock in the foreign country would lead to a larger than usual
destruction of existing relationships, both in home and in foreign countries. As a result, more
new connections will be made in the following period. A permanent adverse demand shock in the
foreign country, that is, a lower average probability of project success, would lead to a decline in
the number of new connections made, both in the short and, to a lesser extent, in the long run. A
permanent adverse supply shock in the foreign country, that is, a lower return on projects for any
given number of projects nanced, would lead to a decline in the number of new connections made
both in the short and the long run.
Overall, the model predicts that while a temporary demand shock would lead to an increase
in the number of new connections, recessions that are more long-lasting, regardless whether they
are demand- or supply-driven, will result in the reduction of the number of new connections. The
intuition from this result is as follows | temporary shocks may destroy existing connections that
need to be replaced, giving a temporary boost to the number of new connections made. In the
long run, however, a reduction in protability of investing in the foreign country is more important,
reducing the incentive for home banks to form new connections.
23Permanent adverse demand or supply shocks in the home country increase the number of new
connections formed as more home banks turn to nancing foreign projects due to a now lower
opportunity cost of not investing in home projects.
A local banking crisis exhibited as an increase in the cost of funding in the foreign country will
give comparative advantage to home banks and therefore lead to an increase in the number of new
connections formed. While in our benchmark model an increase in the cost of funding in the home
country would lower the number of new connections formed by giving comparative advantage to
foreign banks, in this set-up home banks incur the same cost of investing in home and in foreign
projects and therefore this cost has no eect on the number of new connections.
An increase in the cost of intermediation holding the value of relationship constant has an
ambiguous eect on a number of connections formed. This result comes from the fact that home
banks are discouraged from forming new connections by the higher intermediation fee, while at the
same time the intermediation fee is received by foreign banks as pure rent and thus an increase in
this fee reduces the number of foreign banks that are willing to nance their domestic projects. For
the resulting eect to decrease the number of new connections formed we would need to assume
that return on foreign projects declines quickly with an increase in the number of projects nanced,
so that the eect on home banks dominates. A decline in the value of the relationship holding the
intermediation fee constant would lead to fewer new connections made, quite intuitively.
Translating these ndings to empirical terms, we interpret the home country as the U.S., or a
core country in the global banking network. We nd that local recessions in countries other than
U.S. are likely to increase the number of new relationships established by banks initially, but then
lower it as lost connections are replaced. A recession in the U.S. would increase the number of new
connections made by U.S. banks. A local banking crisis that results in a higher cost of funding for
banks would lead to an increase in the number of new relationships formed. In case of a global
banking crisis, which we could think of as a destruction of trust between banks that lowers the
24value of relationships, fewer new connections will be made.
The above model does not create a network of relationships, but it is clear that it could be
extended to include more countries. Dierences in the returns to projects, in costs of funding, as
well as the wedge that arises from intermediation fees would allow for a given country's banks to
receive foreign investment from a country with more banks while at the same time investing in the
country with fewer banks. Consistent with ndings in the literature that banking networks tend
to have a core-periphery structure, we would obtain a network with countries that only receive
funding on the periphery and countries that receive funding and also fund foreign projects in the
core. All of the intuition obtained in the two-country model could readily be extended to such a
network.
5 Regression analysis
We analyze the formation of new connections in a regression setting. Because we are interested in
the incremental eects of recessions and crises on the structure of the global banking network, we
conduct our regression analysis on the bases of cumulative network panel, where we look at rst
dierences of the network characteristics.
We begin by a simple time series analysis where we do not distinguish between countries and
analyze the eects of recessions and crises on the global banking network as a whole. Next we
turn to country-level analysis, where we study how recessions and banking crises in a given country
aect new connections formed by this country's banks and the number of key banks in that country.
In these regressions we control for country xed eects and split our sample into industrial and
developing countries. Finally, we conduct a bank-level analysis, with bank xed eects, where we
study how the probability of a new connection by an individual bank, the probability that bank
becomes a key bank, and the number of new connections it form is aected by banking crises and
25recessions. For all regressions conducted at the bank level we clustering standard errors on country
to avoid downward bias (Moulton, 1990). The results are reported in Tables 2 through 4.
Even though our full network consists of 141 countries and 7938 banks, we don't want oshore
nancial centers and countries with only a few banks to aect our analysis. While all the network
characteristics are computed using the full sample, in the regression analysis we only retain countries
that are not classied as oshore nancial centers in Rose & Spiegel (2007) and that had at least 90
observations in our data (that is, on average at least 3 banks per year in 30 years in the cumulative
network).21
5.1 Time-series regressions
The top panel of Table 2 presents the results of our time series regressions. We are considering
the dynamics of four variables | number of new banks in the GBN, average number of new
lenders (i.e. new borrowing connections) each bank has, average number of new borrowers (i.e.
new lending connections) each bank has, and the number of new key banks in the network. In
network lingo, these correspond to the change in the number of nodes, change in average indegree,
change in average outdegree, and the number of nodes with positive betweenness that either had
zero betweenness or did not exist in the previous year, all computed based on cumulative network
panel. We compute these numbers for the network as a whole and thus we have one observation
per year.
We estimate an OLS regression for each of these variables, computing robust standard errors
to allow for heteroschedasticity. Because the number of new keybanks is rather small, especially
once we move to the country-level regressions, we also estimate a count regression, using negative
binomial (NB) specication for the number of new key borrowers. The interpretation of coecients
is dierent, but as comparison of columns (4) and (5) of Table 2 reveals, qualitatively the results are
21List of countries in our regression sample is provided in the Electronic Appendix.
26the same. In this time series specication we cannot reject a simpler version of the count model, a
Poisson regression, but as we move on to other specication, we denitely observe over-dispersion,
which explains our choice of the NB model.22
In all regressions we control for change in total borrowing. In aggregating the full network it
has to be equal to total lending by construction. Since we excluded some of the countries from the
regression analysis, it is not identically equal, but very closely correlated. As we can see, change in
total borrowing only enters signicantly in the regressions with the change in number of banks or
change in number of key banks as a dependent variable. Since the number of new lenders and of
new borrowers is the average number per bank, it is invariant with respect to the overall lending
in the network.
We also control for linear trend. This may potentially raise a concern with respect to our
estimates of the eects of the global nancial crisis. Indeed, given that the crisis is at the very end
of our sample period, a positive trend would exaggerate the decline during crisis. As it turns out,
however, in all regressions the estimated slope of the trend line is negative thus potentially biasing
down the eects of the global nancial crisis. If we re-estimate the regressions without including
trend, we nd very large and strongly signicant coecients on 2008 and 2009 in all regressions.
We choose to be conservative in our approach and proceed to include trend in all our regressions
as a benchmark.23
Given only 29 observations in the regression, we do not have much power to estimate the eects
precisely. We do see, however, patterns consistent with the predictions of our model. Following
U.S. recessions there is more new connections in terms of both borrowing (new lenders) and lending
(new borrowers), while a larger number of local recessions and banking crises are associated with
fewer new connections made in the subsequent year. In fact, the decline in the average number of
22Estimating this same regression imposing Poisson distribution does not aect the results. It allows, however, to
compute pseudo-R
2, which in this case is equal to 0.35.
23Including quadratic trend instead produces results very similar to those with linear trend and estimates of the
coecient on the quadratic that are very close to zero.
27borrowers is statistically signicant. We also observe a decline in the number of key banks in the
network in the aftermath of all events, and a particularly large and strongly statistically signicant
decline in 2008. According to linear specication, the decline in the number of key banks in 2008
was 18, more than one standard deviation (13), while according to marginal eects of the NB
regression, the number of key banks in 2008 was 54 percent smaller than on average in the sample
(the incidence rate ratio corresponding to this coecient is 0.46).
The eect of the U.S. recessions on the formation of new connections, while consistent with
the model prediction, seems to be at odds with our informal analysis of Figures 2 and 3. This
results arises from the fact that in the regressions we now condition on trend as well as recessions
and banking crises in other countries, all of which have a negative impact on the number of new
connections. Other results are consistent with our graphical analysis.
5.2 Country-level regressions
Bottom panel of Table 2 presents the analysis of the same set of variables in the country panel. Now
all variables are computed as sums or averages for each country in each year. Since borrowing is no
longer identical to lending, we include both change in lending and change in borrowing as controls
(the correlation between change in lending and change in borrowing in this sample is 0.54). As
we expect an increase in borrowing is associated with larger number of new borrowing connections
(number new lenders), while the increase in lending turns out to not aect signicantly the number
of new lending connections (number of new borrowers). We continue to include linear trend and
now we also include country xed eects.24 In these regressions we have 72 countries for 29 years,
an almost balanced panel with 1980 observations.
We nd that local recessions lead to fewer new banks participating in the GBN. Both recessions
24Including instead time xed eects precludes us from identifying eects of U.S. recessions and the global nancial
crisis. This alternative specication, however, strengthens our results with respect to local recessions and banking
crises.
28and banking crises are associated with smaller average number of new lenders for the banks in the
aected country | this is not surprising. While existing lenders are unlikely to exit during the
crisis because they may not be interested in cashing in their losses, new investors are unlikely to
enter a country immediately after a recession or a banking crisis. We also observe a large decline in
the number of key banks overall in the aftermath of U.S. recessions, as well as an additional decline
in the number of key banks in countries aected by local recessions. During the global nancial
crisis the number of key banks dropped in 2008, while in 2009 we observe a smaller number of
borrowers per bank.
We repeat this country-level analysis separately for industrial and for developing countries and
present the results in Table 3. The specication is identical to that of the bottom panel of Table
2. The top panel shows the results for 23 high income OECD countries, while the bottom panel
presents the results for the remaining 49 countries in our regression sample.
We nd no signicant eects of recessions or crises on the new connections made by banks
in the industrial countries. The only exception is a statistically signicant decline in the average
number of new borrowers of banks located in countries that experienced a banking crisis in the
preceding year. We nd a substantial decline in the number of key banks in industrial countries in
the aftermath of U.S. recessions. Surprisingly, we nd an increase in the number of key banks in
industrial countries in 2009.
This indicates that our full sample results are likely to be driven by the banks from developing
countries. Indeed, we nd, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 3, local recessions and banking
crises tend to lower the number of banks in these countries that enter the GBN and lower the number
of new lenders of banks in the aected countries. We also observe a substantial and statistically
signicant decline in the number of banks entering the GBN during the global nancial crisis.
Local recessions and the global nancial crisis are also associated with a reduction in the number
of key banks in developing countries. Combined with the previous observation of an increase in
29the number of key banks in the industrial countries in 2009, this shows that global nancial crisis
moved the network center from developing to industrial countries.
Overall these results suggest that in the past 30 years network positions of banks in industrial
countries have been quite resilient to the eects of recessions and banking crises, which cannot
be said of banks in developing countries. Similarly, banks in the developing countries experienced
more strongly the eects of the global nancial crisis, which is consistent with a larger decline in
international capital ows to and from these countries as documented in Milesi-Ferretti & Tille
(2011).
5.3 Bank-level regressions
Finally we turn to bank-level regressions where we study the eects of recessions and banking
crises on the individual bank's probability of establishing a connection with a new lender or a new
borrower or of becoming a key bank. We also investigate, conditional on establishing at least one
new borrowing or lending connection, the eect of recessions and banking crises on the number of
new connections made. The results are reported in Table 4. First three columns present the results
of the linear probability model regressions of the probability of a new lender, new borrower, or
becoming a key bank, while last two columns present negative binomial regressions for the number
of new borrowing and lending connections, respectively. The reported regressions include country
xed eects.25 All regressions include trend and continue to control for total borrowing and lending,
this time by an individual bank in a given year.
In all regressions we also allow for the eects to be dierent for large banks. For the analysis of
new borrowing connections, we label banks as \large" if their total borrowing over the entire sample
is in the top 10% of that variable's distribution, excluding banks that did not borrow. Similarly,
25The results of linear probability regressions are almost identical if we include bank xed eects instead, while
including bank xed eects in negative binomial regression is computationally challenging given the sample size.
30for the analysis of new lending connections, we label banks as \large" if their total lending over
the entire sample is in the top 10% of the total lending distribution, excluding banks that did not
lend. Finally, for the analysis of the probability of becoming a key bank, we label banks as \large"
if they fall into larger lender and large borrower category. Using this approach, we code, out of
7526 banks in our sample 246 banks as large borrowers, 396 banks as large lenders and 60 banks as
both large borrowers and large lenders. We interact our variables of interest with the \large bank"
indicator, which itself has a positive and strongly signicant eect, as we expected. Along with the
coecient and the standard error of the coecients, we also report the P-value of the signicance
of the total eect for a large bank, based on the F-test for the linear probability regressions and on
2-test for the NB regressions.
We nd that the distribution of the impact of the global nancial crisis was quite dierent
from that of past local recessions and banking crises. Whereas in the aftermaths of recessions and
banking crises small banks tend to be less likely to establish new connections, while large banks
are resilient to these eects, during the global nancial crisis large banks were much less likely to
establish new connections than they normally would, while small banks were in fact more likely
to nd new borrowers. Similarly, large banks during the global nancial crises were less likely to
become key intermediaries, while small banks were not aected in that way. Both small and large
banks that were able to nd new borrowers and lenders during the crisis, established fewer new
connections than they would otherwise.
The impact of U.S. recessions is also in contrast with that of the global nancial crisis. In
the year following a recession in the U.S. small banks are less likely to ned a new borrower and
establish fewer relationships with new lenders, while large banks are in fact more likely to to obtain
new borrowers, although those who do so, establish fewer connections with new borrowers.
316 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced formal measures to describe bank relationships in the global banking
network. Using loan-level data, we constructed networks for each of the years between 1980 and
2009 and computed network statistics for each of the banks that appeared as either a borrower or
a lender in the syndicated loan market during our sample period.
We nd that recessions and banking crises have an important systematic eect on the de-
velopment of the global banking network through altering the ways in which banks make new
connections. Global nancial crisis in particular played an important role by shifting the center of
network from developing to developed countries and by aecting the formation of new relationships
by large banks, banks that are normally immune to the eects of local recessions and banking crises.
Our ndings have two important implications. A methodological implication is that the struc-
ture of a global banking network responds to economic and nancial shocks, and it may therefore not
be appropriate to model banking networks as static and exogenous in a dynamic setting, especially
when the eects of nancial shocks are analyzed. A broad empirical implication is that inasmuch
as bank relationships facilitate international capital ows by overcoming information asymmetry
obstacles, the slow down in building bank relationships during recessions and banking crises, and
especially during the global nancial crisis, might be important in understanding the patterns of
international capital ows in the aftermath of such events.
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36Appendix
Here we show the conditions for our full model equilibrium to be stable and for the interior equilib-
rium, that is 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1, and the derive comparative statics discussed in the text.
Remember that equilibrium is described in the short run by equations (4)-(5) given .





with @R 1(x)=@x = G < 0. Recall that
	 = (N   N) + (2 + )N:








Substituting (4) into (5) and rearranging, we get




where y = (F +   R   V   D)=F.
We can solve these two equations to obtain the short-run solution
SR =
y(N   N)   (   2N)
(N   N)(y   1)
; (9)
SR =
y(   N   N
N(y   1)
: (10)
One can show graphically that the equilibrium is stable if (7) is steeper than (8), that is y > 1,
which means that   R V  D > 0. We can also simply show that both 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1
if the following binding conditions hold:
 > N + N;
y   1 >
   (N + N)
N   N
> 0:







since y > 1 is required for stability of the equilibrium and for interior solution.
In the long run, (6) has to also hold, which implies that
 =

1   : (11)
37Note that  is not a function of . Thus, we can simply substitute (11) into (10) to obtain
LR =
y(   N)(1   )
N(y   1 + )
: (12)
We now derive comparative statics for SR and SR with respect to parameters of the model.




N(y   1)2(1   )

(F   f)(   N   N
F(1   )
  G







N(y   1 + )2

(   N)(1  
f
F
  y2)   G




which is ambiguous because the rst term in the brackets is negative given y > 1 and the second
term is positive given G < 0. The dierence between the eects on SR and LR is the adjustment
of . We will assume that these eects are second-order and therefore overall eect of  on the
number of new connections made is positive. We will make a similar assumption in similar cases
in what follows.
If there is an increase in returns on foreign project for any number of projects nanced (an
upward shift in R), this also implies an increase in  for given level of other parameter values. It











N(y   1 + )
:
Since  and  R always enter together, their eects will be the same, hence we simply take






























   N   N
FN(y   1)2 > 0;
@LR
@D =
(   N)(1   )2
FN(y   1 + )2 > 0:
The fee for establishing a new connection F has two eects | it increases a cost of establishing
38a new connection, but it also increases the value of relationship if f remains constant. Since we want
to disentangle these two eects, we will examine separately an increase in fee for a new connection
holding the value of relationship V constant (that is, an increase in F and f of equal magnitude),
and a decline in the value of relationship holding fee for a new connection constant (that is, and

















N(y   1 + )2

(  R   D   V )(   N
F2 + G




which are both ambiguous unless we want to make assumptions on the shape of R function. There
are two opposing eects at play | when F increases, home banks are less interested in nancing
foreign projects, while foreign banks are also less interested in nancing their projects because



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Table 1: New relationships, key banks, borrowing, and lending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependant var. Borrowing Lending Borrowing Lending
Regression level Bank Bank Country Country





















(13.761) (9.863) (0.235) (0.735)
L4 1.179 6.039 0.362
c 1.701
b





(0.178) (0.282) (0.011) (0.023)
Fixed eects Bank Bank Country Country
Observations 100973 100973 1764 1764
Banks 6982 6982
Countries 72 72 72 72
Adjusted R
2 0.161 0.245 0.568 0.546
OLS regressions with xed eects as indicated.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a signicant at 1% level;
b signicant at 5% level;
c signicant at 10% level.
43Table 2: Eects of recession and banking crises on network characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent var.: # New Banks # New Lenders # New Borrowers # New Key banks
Time series regressions
L.I(US recession) 13.833 0.326 0.266 -1.904 -0.114
(33.247) (0.293) (0.249) (3.103) (0.097)




(1.137) (0.006) (0.005) (0.161) (0.004)
L.# Banking crises -16.998 -0.030 -0.053
c -1.657 -0.058
b
(9.917) (0.032) (0.030) (1.133) (0.028)
I(Year=2008) -9.790 0.006 0.037 -18.515
a -0.780
a
(36.040) (0.104) (0.108) (6.228) (0.147)
I(Year=2009) -17.692 -0.039 0.072 5.714 0.229
(48.925) (0.196) (0.188) (5.567) (0.173)
 borrowing 1134.5







Observations 29 29 29 29 29
Adjusted R
2 0.558 0.488 0.652 0.606 : 0.01
Country panel regressions
L.I(US recession) -0.372 -0.027 0.046 -0.109
b -0.246
b






(0.216) (0.133) (0.030) (0.038) (0.089)
L.I(Banking crisis) -1.019 -0.511
c -0.068 0.003 0.121
(0.774) (0.305) (0.092) (0.078) (0.291)
I(Year=2008) -0.907
c -0.123 -0.084 -0.297
a -0.968
a
(0.512) (0.182) (0.051) (0.082) (0.291)
I(Year=2009) -0.670 0.099 -0.229
a 0.009 0.039
















Fixed eects Country Country Country Country Country
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Countries 72 72 72 72 72
Adjusted R
2 0.657 0.176 0.359 0.369 : 0.48
a
OLS regressions in (1)-(4). Negative binomial (NB) regressions in column (5) .
Dispersion parameter in NB regressions is 1 + e
X0, where  is estimated.  = 0 corresponds to Poisson regression.
NB estimated by ML.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a signicant at 1% level;
b signicant at 5% level;
c signicant at 10% level.
44Table 3: Industrial and developing countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent var.: # New Banks # New Lenders # New Borrowers # New Key banks
High income OECD countries
L.I(US recession) -0.670 -0.103 -0.011 -0.250
a -0.425
a
(0.733) (0.115) (0.077) (0.094) (0.161)
L.I(Recession) -0.742 -0.078 -0.057 -0.114 -0.154
(0.517) (0.095) (0.052) (0.074) (0.117)
L.I(Banking crisis) -3.774 0.017 -0.440
a -0.155 0.062
(5.414) (0.151) (0.138) (0.182) (0.246)
I(Year=2008) -0.240 -0.086 -0.027 -0.132 -0.413
(1.068) (0.123) (0.085) (0.125) (0.309)
I(Year=2009) -0.139 0.089 -0.167 0.447
c 0.673
c
















Observations 665 665 665 665 665
Countries 23 23 23 23 23
Adjusted R
2 0.685 0.227 0.382 0.385 : 0.18
a
Other countries
L.I(US recession) -0.128 -0.035 0.083
c -0.008 0.044






(0.177) (0.181) (0.037) (0.043) (0.141)
L.I(Banking crisis) -0.315 -0.631
c 0.023 0.034 0.218
(0.270) (0.327) (0.102) (0.083) (0.398)
I(Year=2008) -1.219
b -0.315 -0.116 -0.383
a -1.593
a






(0.446) (0.387) (0.078) (0.104) (0.422)
 borrowing 134.362 465.905













Observations 1315 1315 1315 1315 1315
Countries 49 49 49 49 49
Adjusted R
2 0.526 0.184 0.323 0.393 : 0.81
a
OLS regressions with country xed eects in (1)-(4). Negative binomial (NB) regressions in column (5) .
Dispersion parameter in NB regressions is 1 + e
X0, where  is estimated.  = 0 corresponds to Poisson regression.
NB estimated by ML.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a signicant at 1% level;
b signicant at 5% level;
c signicant at 10% level.
45Table 4: Small and large banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent var.: I(New lender) I(New borrower) I(become key) # New lenders # New borrowers
L.I(US recession) -0.004 -0.013
b -0.001 -0.135
b -0.033
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.069) (0.048)
 Large bank 0.013 0.059
b -0.015 0.125 -0.287
a
(0.016) (0.027) (0.010) (0.110) (0.045)
[0.59] [0.099]






(0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.044) (0.052)
 Large bank 0.009 0.040 0.011 -0.022 0.080
c
(0.017) (0.036) (0.010) (0.067) (0.048)
[0.97] [0.45] [0.37] [0.71] [0.15]
L.I(Banking crisis) -0.005 -0.019
c 0.002 -0.118 -0.056
(0.007) (0.011) (0.001) (0.179) (0.106)
 Large bank -0.004 -0.013 -0.034
b 0.294 -0.004







(0.004) (0.009) (0.001) (0.117) (0.097)
 Large bank -0.048
b -0.212
a -0.010 -0.026 -0.247
c












(0.006) (0.014) (0.001) (0.186) (0.156)





























Observations 123145 123145 123145 5326 15732
Banks 7526 7526 7526 1783 3421
Countries 72 72 72 72 68
Adjusted R
2 0.156 0.193 0.018  : 0.73
a 0.47
a
Linear probability regressions in columns (1)-(3). Negative binomial (NB) regressions in columns (4) and (5).
Dispersion parameter in NB regressions is 1 + e
X0, where  is estimated.  = 0 corresponds to Poisson regression.
NB estimated by ML. Large bank is Large borrower in columns (1) and (4), large lender in columns
(2) and (5), large lender and borrower in column (3). Country xed eects included in all regressions.
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parenthesis. P-vales of Wald test in (1)-(3) and 
2 test
in (4)-(5) of joint signicance of the main eect and the interaction term in square brackets.
a signicant at 1% level;
b signicant at 5% level;
c signicant at 10% level.
46